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Arbitration and the Right to Have
Your Day in Court: Meeting Again
at the Turning of The Tide
Lucas Clover Alcolea
I.

Introduction
Arbitration has been the darling of the courts for
decades now, and its position as the dispute resolution
mechanism of choice for big business is generally thought to
be unassailable. This view is not just a subjective opinion
but is borne out by the data. For example, a 2018 study
found that 56.2% of private-sector nonunion employees—
60.1 million U.S. workers—were subject to a mandatory
employment arbitration process. 1 Consumer arbitration is
even more widespread, with a 2019 study finding that there
were over 800 million consumer arbitration agreements in
force, which is more than two and a half times the population
of the U.S. as a whole.2 The U.S. court’s favorable view of
arbitration is also beyond doubt with the Supreme Court
Postdoctoral Associate, Scheinman Institute on Conflict Resolution, Cornell
University School of Industrial and Labor Relations. The author would like to
thank Alexander Colvin, Kenneth F. Kahn ’69 Dean and Martin F.
Scheinman ’75, ‘MS ’76 Professor of Conflict Resolution at the ILR School,
Cornell University, Harry Katz, Jack Sheinkman Professor of Collective
Bargaining, Director, Scheinman Institute, ILR School, Cornell University, and
Edwin Baum, Partner, Perkins Coie, for their helpful comments on a draft
version of this article. All errors, omissions and opinions expressed in this piece
remain the author’s.
1
ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION:
ACCESS TO THE COURTS IS NOW BARRED FOR MORE THAN 60 MILLION
AMERICAN
WORKERS
2,
(Econ.
Pol'y
Inst.
ed.,
2018),
https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitrationaccess-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-americanworkers/.
2
Imre S. Szalai, The Prevalence of Consumer Arbitration Agreements by
America’s Top Companies, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 233, 234 (2019).


539

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2022

1

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 6
[Vol. 22: 539, 2022]

Employment Arbitration
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

stating as far back as 1983 that the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) “is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.” 3
Since then the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down
any restrictions on arbitration imposed by state legislatures
or courts, including requirements that arbitration clauses be
specified prominently in a contract,4 laws or rulings making
class-action waivers in most consumer cases
unconscionable,5 laws lodging exclusive jurisdiction about
talent agency disputes in an administrative tribunal,6 laws
invalidating non-compete agreements in employment
contracts,7 and rulings holding that arbitration agreements in
nursing home contracts could not be enforced with regards
to negligence claims.8
The Supreme Court has justified its decisions on the
basis that “The FAA thus preempts any state rule
discriminating on its face against arbitration . . . [and] also
displaces any rule that covertly accomplishes the same
objective.” 9 This is all despite significant criticism from
scholars that the FAA is being stretched to a breaking point
by the Supreme Court’s decisions and applied in situations
where it was never designed to be used.10
However, as the title of this article suggests, the
situation is no longer as clear cut as it used to be. The
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1982).
Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
5
AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011).
6
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
7
Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17 (2012).
8
Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012).
9
Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1423 (2017).
10
E.g., Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Miconstruction: How the Supreme Court
Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, FLA. STATE
UNIV. L. REV. 99, 99–159; Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the
Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 91, 91–140;
Imre S. Szalai, Directv, Inc. v. Imburgia: How the Supreme Court Used a Jedi
Mind Trick to Turn Arbitration Law Upside Down, 32 OHIO STATE J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 75, 75–110 (2017).
3
4
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Supreme Court’s recent decision in New Prime Inc. v.
Olivera goes against the grain of its earlier pro-arbitration
decisions, and companies are beginning to realize that
arbitration may not always be a good thing for them due to
the rise of mass arbitration. 11 The result is that some
businesses are actually opting for litigation instead of
arbitration in their adhesion contracts, so the employment
and consumer arbitration landscapes have significantly
changed in recent years.12
This article aims to explore court decisions which
have made arbitration less attractive to businesses—both
those which have refused to enforce arbitration clauses and
paradoxically and those which have enforced arbitration
clauses—as well as to provide an overview of businesses'
reactions to those decisions and make some predictions
about the future direction of travel. To that end, this article
will be divided into three main parts. The first will explore
the decision of New Prime Inc. as well as the various federal
appellate decisions that have applied it. The second will
explore the challenges posed by mass arbitration, and the
third will discuss examples of several major companies’
dissatisfaction with arbitration, or at least with their current
arbitration schemes, in recent years.
II.
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira and its Progeny
Although surprisingly little has been written about
New Prime, it is undoubtedly one of the most important
arbitration—and certainly the most important employment
arbitration—decision(s) of the last ten years. This is because
it represents a return to a more restrained and textual
interpretation of the FAA; rather than resorting to congress’s
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” the

New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019).
E.g., Google, Inc.’s Terms of Service Do Not Provide for Arbitration, Terms
of Service, GOOGLE.COM (Jan. 5, 2022),
https://policies.google.com/terms?hl=en-US.
11
12
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justices engaged with the text and its original meaning in
minute detail.13
New Prime Inc. was an interstate trucking company
that employed Dominic Oliveira as a driver; Oliveira was an
independent contractor (this is an important point to
remember).14 The contract between New Prime and Oliveira
required that any disputes be resolved by arbitration and not
litigation. 15 Such a dispute did in fact arise. 16 Oliveira
brought a class action claim in federal court, arguing that
New Prime did not pay its drivers lawful wages; although
the drivers were called “independent contractors,” they were
in fact employees and entitled to the statutory minimum
wage. 17 New Prime sought to have the case removed to
arbitration based on the arbitration clause in its contract with
Oliveira; however, Oliveira argued that the court had no
jurisdiction to order arbitration because section one of the
FAA excludes “contracts of employment of . . . workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” from the
coverage of the Act. 18 Among other things, New Prime
counter-argued that “contracts of employment” only refer to
employment agreements—not independent contractor
agreements—and therefore did not apply to Oliveira.19 Both
the district and appellate courts agreed with Oliveira, and the
case made its way to the Supreme Court.20
The challenge for the Supreme Court was its
previous decision in Circuit Stores v. Adams, where the
Court had adopted a very narrow approach to section 1 of the
FAA and held that “Section 1 exempts from the FAA only
New Prime, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 548 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Moses
H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
14
Id. at 536 (majority opinion).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 538–39.
19
Id. at 541.
20
Id. at 537.
13
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contracts of employment of transportation workers.”21 This
is despite the clear language of the provision, which states
that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce.” 22 As noted by the dissent, this effectively
rewrites the provision to read: “nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of [transportation] workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”23 The majority
justified their decision on the basis of the “ejusdem generis”
canon of interpretation, stating that “[u]nder this rule of
construction the residual clause should be read to give effect
to the terms ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees,’ and should
itself be controlled and defined by reference to the
enumerated categories of workers which are recited just
before it.”24 However, it is clear that the real justification for
the majority’s decision was one of policy, and indeed, this is
alluded to by the majority:
[I]t is true here, just as it was for the parties
to the contract at issue in Allied-Bruce, that
there are real benefits to the enforcement of
arbitration provisions. We have been clear
in rejecting the supposition that the
advantages of the arbitration process
somehow disappear when transferred to the
employment context . . . [a]rbitration
agreements allow parties to avoid the costs
of litigation, a benefit that may be of
particular importance in employment
litigation, which often involves smaller
sums of money than disputes concerning
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
Id. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23
Id. at 128.
24
Id. at 115 (majority opinion).
21
22
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commercial contracts. These litigation
costs to parties (and the accompanying
burden to the courts) would be
compounded by the difficult choice-of-law
questions that are often presented in
disputes arising from the employment
relationship . . . .25
The majority also ignored clear legislative history
and subsequent interpretation, which demonstrated that the
FAA was not intended to apply to employment contracts;26
the majority stated that “we need not assess the legislative
history of the exclusion provision . . . ‘[w]e do not resort to
legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.’”27
The irony, of course, is that while the statute’s meaning was
clear, just not in the way the majority wished; the decisions
of the Supreme Court, both before and since Circuit City,
have done much to cloud its meaning.
The New Prime decision should have been an open
and shut case for the Justices. If they adopted their previous
purposive interpretation of the FAA, then New Prime would
have taken Oliveira to arbitration.28 However, the Supreme
Court opted to eschew the approach adopted in Circuit City.
The Court began with a broadside against its previous
approach to interpreting the FAA by stating that, “if judges
could freely invest old statutory terms with new meanings,
we would risk amending legislation outside the ‘single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure’ the
Constitution commands . . . . We would risk, too, upsetting
Compare id. at 122–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting), with id. at 118–119 (majority
opinion).
26
IMRE S. SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN
ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 191–92 (Carolina Acad. Press, 2013); Moses,
supra note 10, at 105–106, 126, 146–150.
27
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 119 (quoting Ratzlaf v. U.S., 510
U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994)).
28
See id. at 118–19.
25
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reliance interest in the settled meaning of a statute.”29 At
this stage one might be tempted to ask “And? That hasn’t
stopped you before.”
The Court continued to contradict its previous
approach by stating that no one “suggested any other
appropriate reason that might allow us to depart from the
original meaning of the statute at hand.”30 The Court then
decided that:
To many lawyerly ears today, the term
‘contracts of employment’ might call to
mind only agreements between employers
and employees . . . But this modern
intuition isn’t easily squared with evidence
of the term’s meaning at the time of the
Act’s adoption in 1925. At that time, a
‘contract of employment’ usually meant
nothing more than an agreement to perform
work. 31
The Court continued:
What’s the evidence to support this
conclusion? It turns out that in 1925 the
term ‘contract of employment’ wasn’t
defined in any of the (many) popular or
legal dictionaries the parties cite to us. And
surely that’s a first hint the phrase wasn’t
then a term of art . . . . It turns out, too, that
the dictionaries of the era consistently
afforded the word ‘employment’ a broad
construction . . . . All work was treated as
employment.32

New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019).
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 539–40.
29
30
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At this point, it behooves us to consider how far the
Court has come from its previous decision in Circuit City.
In Circuit City, the majority effectively said the exact
opposite of its decision in New Prime, stating that:
It is argued that we should assess the
meaning of the phrase "engaged in
commerce" in a different manner here,
because the FAA was enacted when
congressional authority to regulate under
the commerce power was to a large extent
confined by our decisions . . . . When the
FAA was enacted in 1925, respondent
reasons, the phrase ‘engaged in commerce’
was not a term of art indicating a limited
assertion of congressional jurisdiction . . . .
Were this mode of interpretation to prevail,
we would take into account the scope of the
Commerce Clause, as then elaborated by
the Court, at the date of the FAA's
enactment in order to interpret what the
statute means now.33
The majority rejected this argument by reasoning
that, “A variable standard for interpreting common,
jurisdictional phrases would contradict our earlier cases and
bring instability to statutory interpretation.”34 The Supreme
Court continued to reject its previous approach in Circuit
City when New Prime attempted to argue the policy favoring
arbitration agreements. 35 The Court flatly rejects that
argument and notes that:
If courts felt free to pave over bumpy
statutory texts in the name of more
expeditiously advancing a policy goal, we
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 116.
Id. at 117.
35
See New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. at 543.
33
34
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would risk failing to ‘tak[e] . . . account of’
legislative compromises essential to a
law’s passage and, in that way, thwart
rather than honor ‘the effectuation of
congressional intent.’ By respecting the
qualifications of §1 today, we ‘respect the
limits up to which Congress was prepared’
to go when adopting the Arbitration Act.36
New Prime could therefore not be a clearer rejection
of Circuit City’s methodology, even if the latter case is never
mentioned in the decision. The question therefore becomes:
what changed? Simply put “‘statutory originalism’ is now
the Court’s philosophy of interpretation.” 37 Or, to
paraphrase Justice Kagan, “We are all originalists now.”38
What does this mean for the future of employment
arbitration? Some clues can be gleaned from appellate court
decisions which apply the ruling in New Prime.39
In Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., the First Circuit
adopted the Supreme Court’s originalist approach when
deciding whether an Amazon delivery driver who never
crossed state lines was engaged in interstate commerce. 40
The Court began its approach to the issue by stating that:
to determine what it meant to be ‘engaged
in’ interstate commerce in 1925, and thus
whether Waithaka and his fellow AmFlex
Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
Steven B. Katz, The Supreme Court Embraces Statutory Originalism, A.B.A.
(May 19, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/employment-laborrelations/articles/2019/spring2019-supreme-court-embraces-statutoryoriginalism/.
38
Kagan: ‘We Are All Originalists’, BLOG LEGAL TIMES (June 29, 2010),
https://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/06/kagan-we-are-all-originalists.html.
39
See, e.g., Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10 (2020); Rittmann v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (2020); Singh v. Uber Techs., Inc., 939 F.3d
210 (2019).
40
Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10.
36
37
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workers fall within the scope of the
transportation worker exemption, we
consider the interpretation of statutes
contemporaneous with the FAA, the
sequence of the text of the exemption, the
FAA’s structure, and the purpose of the
exemption and the FAA itself.41
After analyzing a variety of statutes, the Court
concluded that “these cases show that workers moving goods
or people destined for, or coming from, other states—even if
the workers were responsible only for an intrastate leg of that
interstate journey—were understood to be ‘engaged in
interstate commerce’ in 1925.” 42 As in New Prime,
Amazon’s FAA-purpose argument was rejected by the Court
which stated:
We recognize that the FAA was enacted to
counter hostility toward arbitration and that,
accordingly, we must narrowly construe
the statutory exemption from the Act . . . .
However, the FAA's pro-arbitration
purpose cannot override the original
meaning of the statute's text . . . . Moreover,
construing the exemption to include
workers transporting goods within the flow
of interstate commerce advances, rather
than
undermines,
‘Congress'[s]
demonstrated concern with transportation
workers and their necessary role in the free
flow of goods.43
The Court also rejected the policy argument that “a
decision in Waithaka's favor would introduce uncertainty
Id. at 18.
Id. at 22.
43
Id. at 24.
41
42
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about the FAA's coverage and spawn extensive litigation
about the scope of the residual clause.”44 The Court stated
that:
the notion that Amazon's proposed
standard would create an easily
administrable, bright-line rule is illusory.
If crossing state lines were the touchstone
of the exemption's test, the parties would
still engage in discovery to determine how
often a class of workers moved interstate
and would litigate what portion of a given
group of workers must cross state lines and
with what frequency to qualify as a class of
workers ‘engaged in . . . interstate
commerce.’45
The Court also ironically deployed Circuit City
against Amazon noting that:
the line-drawing conundrum that Amazon
identifies would not stem from our decision.
Rather, it is a product of Circuit City itself.
In concluding that the residual clause does
not encompass all employment contracts,
but only those of transportation workers,
the [Supreme] Court left it to the lower
courts to assess which workers fall within
that category. 46
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., which also involved Amazon
delivery drivers.47 The Court stated that:
Id. at 25.
Id.
46
Id.
47
Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 1374 (2021).
44
45
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Our reading of the statutory text is
reinforced by decisions of other circuits
and our own that have applied the
exemption, as well as decisions that
interpret similar statutory language. Most
recently, in a nearly identical case
involving the AmFlex program, the First
Circuit held that AmFlex delivery
providers fall within the § 1 exemption.
Relying on much of the same reasoning
discussed below, pp. 911-15, the First
Circuit looked to statutes contemporaneous
to the FAA, in particular the Federal
Employees Liability Act (FELA) of 1908,
to conclude that the meaning of the phrase
‘engaged in interstate commerce,’ as
understood at the time of the FAA's
passage, was not limited to those
transportation workers who themselves
crossed state lines.48
As in Waithaka, the Court rejected a policy-based
argument by Amazon that
[W]e must narrow the definition of
‘engaged in foreign or interstate commerce’
to accord with the FAA's statutory context
and pro-arbitration purposes . . . . Nothing
in Circuit City requires that we rely on the
pro-arbitration purpose reflected in § 2 to
even further limit the already narrow
definition of the phrase ‘engaged in
commerce.’49

Id. at 910 (citing Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 966 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir.
2020)).
49
Id. at 914.
48
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Ultimately the Court concluded that “In light of our
construction of the statute and consideration of the record,
we conclude that AmFlex delivery providers belong to a
class of workers engaged in interstate commerce that falls
within § 1's exemption.”50
The ripples of New Prime have also extended
beyond obvious categories of truck drivers of one kind or
another, and questions are now being asked about whether
Uber (and other rideshare company) drivers are affected by
that decision. In the Third Circuit decision of Singh v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., the court held that transportation workers
who transport passengers may be exempt from the FAA
under section one. 51 The court noted that “a textual
approach to the residual clause of § 1 suggests that it extends
to both transportation workers who transport goods as well
as those who transport passengers.”52 The Court concluded
that:
In the end, we remain unswayed by Uber's
attempt to drive us towards its imagined
sunset. Consistent with our decisions in
Tenney, Greyhound I, and Greyhound II,
we hold that the residual clause of § 1 of
the FAA may operate to exclude from FAA
coverage the contracts of employment of
all classes of transportation workers, so
long as they are engaged in interstate
commerce, or in work so closely related
thereto as to be in practical effect part of
it.53
However, the Court did not reach a final decision
“because neither the Complaint nor incorporated documents
Id. at 915.
Singh v. Uber Techs., Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 219–20 (3d Cir. 2019).
52
Id. at 222.
53
Id. at 226.
50
51
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suffice to resolve the engaged-in-interstate-commerce
inquiry” 54 but rather “remand[ed] this and the remaining
issues to the District Court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.” 55 It is unclear what ultimately happened
in the case as there are no further reports on it but it appears
that it was still ongoing five years later.56
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Saxon v.
Southwest Airlines illustrates just how far some appellate
courts are taking the exemption.57 In that case, a dispute
arose between Latrice Saxon, a ramp supervisor responsible
for managing and assisting workers loading and unloading
airplane cargo for Southwest Airlines, her employer. 58
Saxon then argued that she was a transportation worker
covered by the section 1 FAA exemption, whilst Southwest
disputed this.59
The Court engaged in a textual and historical
analysis of the FAA, stating that “[t]o understand the scope
of that category [i.e. transportation workers], we explained
in Wallace, ‘our inquiry ‘begins with the text.’ . . . We
interpret the words of that text ‘based on their ordinary
meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute.’”60 The
Court then highlighted what it called two “textual clue[s],”61
the first was the phrase ‘class of worker’ which obligates us
to focus on the broader occupation, not the individual
worker.’62 The second “is the two enumerated categories of
seamen and railroad employees, which provides a gloss on
Id. at 214.
Id.
Linda Chiem, Uber Rips NJ Driver’s Bid To Bypass Arbitration In Wage
Fight, LAW 360 (July 26, 2021, 6:55 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1406780/uber-rips-nj-driver-s-bid-tobypass-arbitration-in-wage-fight.
57
Saxon v. Sw. Airlines Co., 993 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2021).
58
Id. at 495.
59
Id. at 494–95.
60
Id. at 495.
61
Id. at 496.
62
Id.
54
55
56
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what it means for a class of workers to be ‘engaged in
commerce.’” 63 The Court noted that “to be exempted under
the residual clause of section 1, the ramp supervisors must
themselves be engaged in interstate or foreign commerce . . . .
[t]his line is not easy to draw.”64 However, ultimately the
Court held that “Wherever the line may be . . . . ramp
supervisors fall on the transportation worker side of it.” 65
The Court justified its view on the basis that:
A central part of their job is the loading and
unloading of cargo for planes on interstate
and international flights. Although this is
officially the role of the ramp agents,
Saxon estimates that she and her peers each
cover three full ramp-agent shifts per week.
Southwest offered no evidence to
contradict this estimate. 66
Southwest argued that the loading and unloading of
cargo was not enough to make someone a transportation
worker because it was not actual transportation.67 The Court
accepted the premise but rejected the conclusion, that Saxon
was not therefore engaged in transportation, stating that:
Actual transportation is not limited to the
precise moment either goods or the people
accompanying them cross state lines.
Loading and unloading cargo onto a
vehicle so that it may be moved interstate,
too, is actual transportation and those who
performed that work in 1925 were
recognized to be engaged in commerce.68

Id.
Id. at 497.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 497.
68
Id. at 498.
63
64
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The Court also went on to compare Saxon’s role
with that of seamen 69 and railroad employees, 70 before
holding that all three roles were comparable, in particular at
the time the FAA was enacted in 1925.71 Southwest argued
that there was a risk of a “slippery slope—excluding ramp
supervisors could eventually lead to excluding ticket and
gate agents, security guards, taxi drivers, and airport vendors
all on the ground that each supports the work of the
airline.”72 The Court rejected this argument noting that:
Southwest does not suggest transportation
workers are limited to those who physically
cross state lines and we do not think such a
limitation could be supported. The loading
of goods into a vehicle travelling to another
state or country is the step that both
immediately and necessarily precedes the
moment the vehicle and goods cross the
border. To say that this closely related
work is interstate transportation does not
necessarily mean that the work of a
ticketing or gate agents… or others even
further removed from that moment qualify
too.73
Although one must be sympathetic to the Court,
given that it is navigating an interpretative morass of the
Supreme Court’s making—in reality, it is hard to justify its
conclusion. The fact is that some Circuits have held that that
transportation of people, not just goods, amounts to interstate
commerce, and it is not therefore irrational to argue that, at
least, gate agents could qualify for the section 1 exemption
as they load passengers onto a plane in the same way that
Id. at 499–500.
Id. at 500–03.
71
Id. at 502.
72
Id. at 501.
73
Id. at 502.
69
70
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cargo handlers load cargo onto a plane. Southwest’s fear of
a slippery slope was not therefore unfounded, and the Court
dismissed it a little too easily.
The bigger issue in all FAA section 1 cases is that
the phrase “transportation worker,” which was glossed onto
the plain text of the FAA, is being asked to do heavy lifting
which it cannot possibly do. Courts, having been forced into
applying the FAA in situations where it was never designed
to apply, and arguably does not work, are now released from
a “mental block” of sorts due to the New Prime decision and
are therefore using the section 1 exemption as a silver bullet
to deal with the problem of the FAA’s overapplication. 74
However, this just exacerbates the problem of the FAA being
interpreted contrary to its plain meaning and legislative
history except that this time it is in an anti, rather than a proarbitration way. The correct solution would be to reverse the
decision of the Supreme Court in Circuit Stores holding that
the FAA’s Section 1 exemption applied only to
“transportation workers” and instead hold that it applies to
all workers engaged in interstate and foreign commerce.
Unfortunately, this is unlikely, as it is inherently improbable
that the Supreme Court will overrule over 20 years of
precedent given the chaos it likely fears doing so might cause.
However, one can fairly ask: what causes more chaos?
Overruling 20 years of precedent or continuing the current
interpretative morass for another 20 years? The Court may
well answer this question shortly as it has granted the
petition of certiorari filed by Southwest Airlines75 in Saxon
v Southwest and we may therefore have a clear indication of
how far (or not) the Supreme Court has come from viewing
arbitration as the Summum Bonum.
It must also be admitted that some courts have been
able to avoid the worst of the interpretative morass, by
interpreting the section 1 exemption in a much more
74
75

New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019).
Saxon v. Sw. Airlines Co., 993 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2021).
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restrained fashion. However, such decisions do not address
the issue of the FAA’s overapplication or the problem of
applying a judicial gloss on a text which is clearly contrary
to the plain wording of that text. For example, the Ninth
Circuit in Capriole v Uber Techs., Inc. 76 rejected the
argument that Uber drivers were exempt from the FAA. The
Court held that “Uber drivers, as a class, ‘are not engaged in
interstate commerce’ because their work ‘predominantly
entails intrastate trips,’ even though some Uber drivers
undoubtedly cross state lines in the course of their work and
rideshare companies do contract with airports ‘to allow Uber
drivers . . . to pick up arriving passengers.’”77 The Court
went on to note that:
As almost any user of Uber's product
would attest, Uber trips are often short and
local, and they only infrequently involve
either crossing state lines or a trip to a
transportation hub, as the evidence
demonstrates. And “someone whose
occupation is not defined by its
engagement in interstate commerce does
not qualify for the exemption just because
she occasionally performs that kind of
work.”78
The Ninth Circuit distinguished the case at hand
from its earlier decision in Rittman by saying that:
Uber stalwartly objects to any notion that
interstate transportation is intrinsic to its
service, and Plaintiffs have proffered no
evidence undermining Uber’s position.
Moreover, even when transporting
passengers to and from transportation hubs
Capriole v Uber Techs., Inc., 7 F.4th 857, (9th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 864.
78
Id.
76
77
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as part of a larger foreign or interstate trip,
Uber drivers are unaffiliated, independent
participants in the passenger’s overall trip,
rather than an integral part of a single,
unbroken stream of interstate commerce
like AmFlex workers.79
The Ninth Circuit is not alone in its rejection of the
section 1 exemption to the gig economy, for example, the
Seventh Circuit in the case of Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings,
Inc.80 rejected the argument that Grubhub takeaway delivery
drivers fell within said exemption. The Court noted that
“Whether easy or hard … the inquiry is always focused on
the worker's active engagement in the enterprise of moving
goods across interstate lines. That is the inquiry that Circuit
City demands.”81 This view clashes with that of the Third
Circuit which stated that transportation of persons, not just
goods, qualified as interstate commerce, but it is worth
noting that the case at hand concerned goods (namely food)
and not people. The plaintiff in Grubhub made the
ambitious argument that:
[T]hey carry goods that have moved across
state and even national lines. A package of
potato chips, for instance, may travel
across several states before landing in a
meal prepared by a local restaurant and
delivered by a Grubhub driver; likewise, a
piece of dessert chocolate may have
traveled all the way from Switzerland. The
plaintiffs insist that delivering such goods
brings their contracts with Grubhub within
§ 1 of the FAA.82
Id. at 866.
Wallace v Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2020).
81
Id. at 802.
82
Id.
79
80
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The Court rejected this argument stating, logically
enough, that “the workers must be connected not simply to
the goods, but to the act of moving those goods across state
or national borders. Put differently, a class of workers must
themselves be ‘engaged in the channels of foreign or
interstate commerce.’” 83 The Court therefore concluded
that:
Section 1 of the FAA carves out a narrow
exception to the obligation of federal courts
to enforce arbitration agreements. To show
that they fall within this exception, the
plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the
interstate movement of goods is a central
part of the job description of the class of
workers to which they belong. They did not
even try to do that, so both district courts
were right to conclude that the plaintiffs'
contracts with Grubhub do not fall within §
1 of the FAA.84
It would seem, therefore, that whilst the ripples of
New Prime reach beyond traditional truck drivers, they
probably do not reach as far as rideshare drivers or rideshare
delivery drivers. It is also unclear how New Prime might
affect consumer arbitrations. Although the history of the
FAA arguably doesn’t support the existence of consumer
arbitration,85 consumers, unlike employees, cannot point to
any provision in the FAA that excludes them from its scope.
Consequently, even with a new, more restrained approach to
arbitration, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will reverse
decades of precedent and rewrite the entire consumer dispute
resolution system by striking down or limiting consumer
arbitration. On the other hand, as will be seen below, the
Id.
Id. at 803.
85
Szalai, supra note 26, at 192–98.
83
84
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Court had no problem doing so for the class arbitration
system.
Therefore, one cannot entirely exclude the
possibility either. As will be seen below, the most that can
be said is that the possibility of pro-consumer arbitration
regulations being preempted might be significantly reduced
in the post New Prime landscape. In any event, the era of
blasé or ritual incantations of “the liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements” when interpreting the FAA
appears to be over. In the future the text and history of the
FAA will be key in its interpretation, this is as it always
should have been.
III.

Don’t Make Me Arbitrate, Please
This section addresses recent situations where
businesses don’t want to arbitrate but have to. It will not
come as a surprise that this section, and the cases it discusses,
are rich with poetic justice. Before discussing the relevant
cases, it is important to analyze the context behind them,
namely the Supreme Court’s stymying of class arbitration.
Class arbitration is effectively what it sounds like:
it involves the “import [of] elements of U.S.-style class
actions into the arbitral context, resolving anywhere from
dozens to hundreds of thousands of individual claims in a
single representative proceeding.”86 It began in the 1980s
and remained a niche form of dispute resolution until the
2003 Supreme Court decision of Green Tree Financial
Corporation v. Bazzle 87 where a plurality held that
arbitrators and not the courts should decide whether class
arbitration was permitted by an arbitration clause. 88 This
opened the floodgates to class arbitration and companies

S. I. Strong, Resolving Mass Legal Disputes through Class Arbitration: The
United States and Canada Compared, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. 921–980, 934 (2011).
87
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2011).
88
Gary Born & Claudio Salas, United States Supreme Court and Class
Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, The Symposium 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 22–48,
41–42 (2012).
86
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subsequently took measures to avoid it, 89 likely for many of
the same reasons that businesses seek to avoid class action
litigation.
However, the Supreme Court subsequently
disavowed its earlier approach (although in fairness, it must
be said that Green Tree was merely a plurality and not a
majority decision) and effectively killed class arbitration by
holding that courts could decide whether class arbitration
was permitted and that silent arbitration clauses did not
permit class arbitration. 90 Subsequent decisions further
eroded the possibility of class arbitration.
First, it was held that class arbitration was barred
not only in the case of silent arbitration clauses, but also
when arbitration clauses are ambiguous. 91 Then, it was held
that the FAA preempted a California rule that made class
arbitration waivers unconscionable.92 The consequence of
these decisions is that class arbitration is effectively dead or
at the very, least severely restricted.93 However, Americans
and American plaintiff lawyers cannot be stopped so easily,
which has led to the creation of “mass arbitration.”
Mass arbitration occurs when a firm simultaneously
files thousands of separate arbitrations for clients in the same
situation against the same business. 94 For example, Amazon
recently faced 75,000 claims by Amazon Echo users alleging

Id. at 31.
Id. at 33–35.
91
Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2009); cf.
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1412–19 (2019).
92
AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011).
93
Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration after Concepcion, 60 U.
KAN. L. REV. 767–794 (2012); Joanna Niworowski, Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela:
Dark Times Ahead for Class Arbitrations, 75 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257–300 (2020);
Born, supra note 88.
94
Proliferation of Mass Arbitration: Ballooning Costs and Emerging Tactics,
QUINN, EMANUEL, URQUHART, & SULLIVAN, LLP (Dec. 2, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/lead-article-proliferation-of-mass7129882/#:~:text=Mass%20arbitration%20occurs%20when%20hundreds,on
%20a%20common%20legal%20theory.
89
90
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Amazon violated their privacy,95 while Doordash received
2,250 similar claims in one day.96 This practice has been
spearheaded by Keller Lenkner LLC which initiated both
actions,97 and in many respects poses a much more serious
problem for businesses than class arbitration. This is
because companies need to pay their share of the filing fee
in each and every claim filed against them, and also must
pay the lion's share of the fee in some cases too.98 It goes
without saying that the cost of paying these fees for several
thousand cases is significant, for example Uber was recently
ordered to pay approximately $107 million in filing fees
relating to over 31,000 arbitrations, 99 whilst in another
recent case Doordash was ordered to pay $9.5 million in fees
in relation to just over 5,000 arbitrations.100
Notwithstanding the above, companies who now
say “Don’t make me arbitrate, please” can refuse to pay and
Mitchell Clark, Amazon Did The Math and Would Actually Prefer Getting
Sued, THE VERGE (Jun. 1, 2021),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/6/1/22463550/amazon-lawsuit-arbitrationterms-of-service-update-alexa.
96
Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, ‘Scared to Death’ by
Arbitration: Companies Drowning in Their Own System, THE N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
6,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/business/arbitrationoverload.html.
97
Amazon Faced 75,000 Arbitration Demands. Now it Says—Fine, Sue Us,
KELLER LENKNER, LLC (June 1, 2021) [hereinafter Amazon Faced],
https://www.kellerlenkner.com/wall-street-journal-amazon-faced-75000arbitration-demands-now-it-says-fine-sue-us/; DoorDash Must Arbitrate
Misclassification Suit, Couriers Say, KELLER LENKNER, LLC (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://www.kellerlenkner.com/doordash-must-arbitrate-misclassification-suitcouriers-say/.
98
ARTICLE
XI:
PAYMENT
FOR
SERVICES,
DOORDASH,
https://help.doordash.com/dashers/s/ica-us?language=en_US (last visited Feb.
28, 2022).
99
Uber Technologies Inc v American Arbitration Association Inc, 2022
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, First Judicial
Department.
100
“DoorDash Ordered to Pay $9.5M to Arbitrate 5,000 Labor Disputes”, (11
February 2020), online: Keller Lenkner LLC
<https://www.kellerlenkner.com/doordash-ordered-to-pay-9-5m-to-arbitrate5000-labor-disputes/>.
95
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benefit from the asymmetries of employment arbitration.
Since arbitration institutions will not administer a case
unless both sides pay their share of the fee, and since
consumers cannot afford to pay the arbitration fees of the
business they are suing, a business can block arbitration
simply by refusing to pay.101 Unfortunately for companies,
the FAA, unlike many other arbitration statutes, allows
courts to order parties to arbitrate.102 In consequence, courts
can compel a party to arbitrate and pay the fees of arbitration
whether they want to or not.
This is exactly what happened in the case of
Abernathy v Doordash,103 where over 6,000 individuals filed
claims against DoorDash which required the company to pay
over $12 million in administrative fees to the American
Arbitration Association (AAA).104 DoorDash refused to pay
the fees alleging, “deficiencies with the claimants’ filings,”
and the AAA refused to administer the arbitration and closed
DoorDash’s file.105 The Plaintiffs asked the court to compel
DoorDash to pay their share of the fees and the court granted
this request, with the caveat that:
If it turns out that Keller Lenkner has
overstated its authority, or for any
procedural reason, petitioners have not
perfected their right to arbitrate, this order
imposes on Keller Lenkner a requirement
to fully reimburse DoorDash for all
arbitration fees and attorney’s fees and
expenses incurred by Doordash in
defending the arbitration, and the arbitrator
For an example see Mcclenon v. Postmates Inc., 473 F. Supp. 3d 803, 806–
08 (2020).
102
See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1954).
103
Terrell Abernathy, et al., Petitioners, v. Doordash, Inc., Respondent.
Christine Boyd, et al., Petitioners, v. Doordash, Inc., Respondent., 2020 WL
974352 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020).
104
Id.
105
Id. at 2.
101
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shall so award them. 106 The judge also
sharply criticized the behavior of Doordash
stating that:
For decades, the employer-side
bar and their employer clients
have forced arbitration clauses
upon workers, thus taking away
their right to go to court, and
forced class-action waivers upon
them too, thus taking away their
ability to join collectively to
vindicate common rights… The
irony, in this case, is that the
workers wish to enforce the very
provisions forced on them by
seeking, even if by the thousands,
individual
arbitrations,
the
remnant of procedural rights left to
them. The employer here,
DoorDash, faced with having to
actually honor its side of the
bargain, now blanches at the cost
of the filing fees it agreed to pay in
the arbitration clause. No doubt,
DoorDash never expected that so
many would actually seek
arbitration. Instead, in irony upon
irony, DoorDash now wishes to
resort to a class-wide lawsuit, the
very device it denied to the
workers, to avoid its duty to
arbitrate. This hypocrisy will not
be blessed, at least by this order.107
106
107

Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
Id. at 1067–68.
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In many respects, the case is a testament to the
ingenuity of the plaintiffs’ bar who have managed to
successfully navigate a system that is very much stacked
against them. Although the tactics used by the plaintiffs in
Abernathy are innovative, it is hard to see how they can be
faulted from a legal perspective, since they are not class
arbitration claims but rather individual arbitration claims and
all the procedural rules of the AAA have presumably been
complied with by the plaintiffs. If they were not, the AAA
would not accept the case or would be otherwise empowered
to penalize or respond to the lack of compliance. Moreover,
as noted by the NY Supreme Court’s Appellate division in
Uber Technologies v American Arbitration Association,108
“it made the business decision to preclude class, collective,
or representative claims in its arbitration agreement with its
consumers, and AAA’s fees are directly attributable to that
decision.”109 In other words, you’ve made your bed so now
you have to lie in it. It is therefore unlikely that the
procedure is subject to attack whether on the grounds of
preemption or otherwise. The irony of course is that if
employment arbitration was not possible, or if Doordash
drivers were excluded from the scope of the FAA under
section 1, the entire process would collapse. For the first
time, businesses have a real incentive to attack broad
interpretations of the FAA and, in many respects, they are
reaping the bitter fruits of decades of the Supreme Court’s
pro-arbitration jurisprudence.
The situation for businesses in California has
become even more problematic since the Abernathy decision
because of the decision in Postmates Inc. v. 10,356
Individuals, which required Postmates to engage in over

Uber Technologies Inc v American Arbitration Association Inc, supra note
99.
109
Id. at 6.
108
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10,000 individual arbitrations. 110 In that case, Postmates
refused to pay its portion of the fees and the AAA refused to
administer the case closing its files, resulting in the plaintiffs
petitioning the court to compel arbitration.111 Postmates is
of interest not just because it provides another example of an
Abernathy deluge of employment claims, but because it
interprets a novel recent amendment to the California Code
of Civil Procedure as a result of the passing of Senate Bill
No 707 (SB-707).112
The provisions in SB-707 apply in employment and
consumer arbitrations where the drafting party is required to
pay certain fees or costs before the arbitration can proceed,
that is to say they apply to virtually all employment and
consumer arbitrations. In such cases, if the required fees are
not paid within 30 days of the due date “the drafting party is
in material breach of the arbitration agreement, is in default
of the arbitration, and waives its right to compel arbitration
under Section 1281.2”.113 The consequence of this is that
the employee or consumer has the option to withdraw the
claim from arbitration and go to court, or compel arbitration
“in which the drafting party shall pay reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs related to the arbitration”. 114 Similar
provisions apply if the drafting party refuses to pay fees
during an ongoing arbitration although the consumer can
also:
(3) Petition the court for an order
compelling the drafting party to pay all
arbitration fees that the drafting party is
obligated to pay under the arbitration
agreement or the rules of the arbitration
company [or] (4) Pay the drafting party’s
Postmates Inc. v. 10,356 Individuals, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28554 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 19, 2021).
111
Id. at *5–6.
112
S.B. 707, 2019 (Cal. 2019).
113
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.97.
114
Id.
110
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fees and proceed with the arbitration
proceeding. As part of the award, the
employee or consumer shall recover all
arbitration fees paid on behalf of the
drafting party without regard to any
findings on the merits in the underlying
arbitration.115
These provisions go beyond the FAA in allowing
California courts not just to compel arbitration but also
compensating consumers or employees for the refusal of the
drafting party (that is to say the business) to proceed with an
arbitration. By effectively requiring businesses to either
willingly arbitrate their claims or be forced into arbitration
by a consumer or employee and pay all their fees, the
provisions significantly reduce the attractiveness of
arbitration for businesses. This is because they can no longer
game the system. Moreover, it would appear that the
provisions can be invoked not just by consumers but also by
arbitration institutions and thus the provisions very much put
businesses on the defensive.116 However, there is a risk that
the provisions might be held to be preempted by the FAA
and this is exactly the argument Postmates made before the
court in the case at hand. The Court rejected this argument
by noting that unlike previous cases where the Supreme
Court had held a state provision regulating arbitration was
preempted:
[R]ather than render arbitration agreements
invalid or unenforceable, SB 707
encourages arbitration by changing the
remedies available to parties when drafting
parties delay the process and refuse to pay
the required fees… Therefore, SB 707 is
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.98.
Uber Technologies Inc v American Arbitration Association Inc, supra note
99 at 3.
115
116
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pro-arbitration because it makes arbitration
more effective and efficient. Instead of
nullifying arbitration agreements, the law
ensures a speedy resolution under their
terms by preventing parties such as
Postmates from holding hostage employees’
or consumers’ validly arbitrable claims.117
However, one might (and indeed Postmates did)
point out that the law renders arbitration agreements
unenforceable if a drafting party fails to pay due fees for over
thirty days and thus is preempted.118 The Court rejected that
submission by noting that the provision did not
automatically render arbitration provisions invalid but rather
merely offered non-drafting parties a choice as to whether to
proceed with arbitration or not.119 It also noted that “SB 707
encourages their prompt enforcement by expanding the
remedies available to parties seeking to enforce their rights
through arbitration in an efficient manner.”120 Finally, the
Court referred to many examples where provisions singled
out arbitration, for example, by providing for specific
performance of arbitration agreements, and noted that these
were not preempted as they encouraged arbitration.121 It is
unclear whether this argument is sound given the Supreme
Court’s ruling that the FAA prohibits any rule that covertly
discriminates against arbitration and one could argue that
certain portions of SB 707 do just that. 122 Moreover, the
specific performance argument is unconvincing considering
that the FAA itself provides for specific performance of

Postmates Inc. v. 10,356 Individuals, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28554 at *21
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2021).
118
See id., at *12.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 12–13.
122
Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S.Ct. 1421 (2017).
117
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arbitration agreements in section 4.123 On the other hand, in
the post New Prime world, it is possible that the Supreme
Court might take a less expansive view on preemption and
refuse to strike down SB 707.
In considering whether the Supreme Court is likely
to eventually uphold or strike down the provisions of SB 707,
it is useful to look at a similar, recent California Employment
law regulation; Assembly Bill 51 (AB 51), as well as
Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta124 which partially validated
and partially invalidated the regulation. AB 51 was enacted
to ensure “that individuals are not retaliated against for
refusing to consent to the waiver of . . . rights and procedures
[established in the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act] and to ensure that any contract relating to those rights
and procedures be entered into as a matter of voluntary
consent, not coercion.” 125 The Bill sets out civil and
criminal penalties for violation of its provisions, but also
provides that “[n]othing in this section is intended to
invalidate a written arbitration agreement that is otherwise
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.”126
The legislation was challenged by the Chamber of
Commerce as preempted under the FAA, which claim was
upheld by the district court, and the matter therefore came
before the Ninth Circuit of Appeals.127 The key issues were
two provisions of section three of AB 51 which provide that
employees could not be required to waive employment law
rights, including rights to pursue civil actions or the right to
access particular forums, in order to be employed or receive
employment benefits, nor could employers retaliate,
terminate or threaten employees because they refused to

FAA § 4.
Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta, 13 F.4th 766 (9th Cir. 2021); CAL. ASSEMB.
B. 51 (2019).
125
CAL. ASSEMB. B. 51 (2019).
126
Id.; cf. CAL. LAB. CODE § 433 (1937); see also Bonta, 13 F.4th 766.
127
Bonta, 13 F.4th 766.
123
124
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waive said rights.128 The District Court in Chamber of Com.
v. Bonta held that these provisions were preempted because
they “embod[ied] . . . a legal rule hinging on the primary
characteristic of an arbitration agreement, and placing
arbitration agreements in a class apart from any contract.”129
However, the Ninth Circuit rejected this view on the
following basis:
[Section] 432.6 does not make invalid or
unenforceable any agreement to arbitrate,
even if such agreement is consummated in
violation of the statute. Rather, while
mandating
that
employer-employee
arbitration agreements be consensual, it
specifically provides that ‘[n]othing in this
section is intended to invalidate a written
arbitration agreement that is otherwise
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration
Act.’130
The issue is that the provision is, deliberately,
drafted in an inelegant manner. In effect, what it means is
that (a) an employer cannot force a worker to agree to an
arbitration agreement as a condition of employment or
certain benefits, nor can they retaliate against him for
refusing to agree to arbitration, but (b) arbitration
agreements enforceable under the FAA are not affected by
the provision. As arbitration agreements under the FAA
must be consensual, the two sections, which seem to conflict,
do not actually contradict each other. 131 If an arbitration
agreement was reached consensually, then it will fall into the

CAL. LAB. CODE § 3(a)–(b).
Bonta, 13 F.4th, at 776 (quoting Chamber of Com. v. Becerra, 438 F. Supp.
3d 1078, 1098 (E.D. Cal. 2020)).
130
Id. (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.6(f)).
131
Compare CAL. LAB. CODE § 433 (1937), with CAL. ASSEMB. B. 51 (2019).
128
129
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scope of (b). 132 This argument is somewhat legalistic, even
though the majority dismisses these concerns by stating that:
[o]f course, nothing in § 2 grants an
employer the right to force arbitration
agreements on unwilling employees. The
only ‘federally protected right’ conferred
by the FAA is the right to have consensual
agreements to arbitrate enforced according
to their terms. Because nothing in § 432.6
interferes with this right, it does not stand
as an obstacle to the purposes and
objectives of the FAA.133
However, the majority did hold that the
enforcement mechanism for this section was preempted by
the FAA stating that “Section § 432.6 is not preempted by
the FAA because it is solely concerned with pre-agreement
employer behavior, but the accompanying enforcement
mechanisms that sanction employers for violating § 432.6
necessarily include punishing employers for entering into an
agreement to arbitrate.” 134 The Ninth Circuit concluded,
logically enough, that just as a state cannot prohibit
arbitration of certain type of claims “it also may not impose
civil or criminal sanctions on individuals or entities for the
act of executing an arbitration agreement” 135 and in
consequence the enforcement provisions of AB 51 were
preempted “to the extent that they apply to executed
arbitration agreements covered by the FAA”.136
One might be tempted to say that the result of the
Ninth Circuit’s decision is that AB 51 is effectively
irrelevant because its enforcement provisions are preempted,
however this is not actually the case. The Ninth Circuit
Id.
Bonta, 13 F.4th, at 779–80.
134
Id. at 28.
135
Id. at 28–29.
136
Id.
132
133
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carefully worded its ruling so that it only applied to
arbitration agreements covered by the FAA, consequently, if
an employee can prove that the arbitration clause was not
consensual, and is therefore void, it would not fall within the
scope of the FAA and an employer could be liable for the
enforcement measures provided in AB 51. This issue is in
fact alluded to by the majority when it states that:
Irrespective of AB 51’s enforcement
mechanisms, an employee may attempt to
void an arbitration agreement that he was
compelled to enter as a condition of
employment on the basis that it was not
voluntary. If a court were to find that such
a lack of voluntariness is a generally
applicable contract defense that does not
specifically target agreements to arbitrate,
the arbitration agreement may be voided in
accordance
with
saving
clause
jurisprudence.137
Although from a strictly legal point of view the
majority is likely correct, it is difficult to fault the dissent’s
view that this is a “too-clever-by-half workaround”138 which
“under Supreme Court precedent… is entirely preempted by
the FAA.”139 That is not to say that the author agrees with
current Supreme Court precedent, he clearly does not, but it
is to say that the regulation, despite its clumsy wording and
the majority’s magnanimous interpretation of it, simply
doesn’t do enough to disguise its anti-arbitration animus. It
is also clear that the regulation discourages arbitration
because employers will be concerned that if a court finds an
arbitration invalid, and therefore outside the scope of the
FAA, they may be subject to significant civil or criminal
Id. at 25.
Id. at 36.
139
Id.
137
138
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penalties. In consequence, they may decide to take the safer
option and simply litigate any disputes. This result clearly
cuts against the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary” 140 and thus it is hard to
see how the enforcement provisions wouldn’t be entirely
preempted under existing Supreme Court precedent.
In any event, the consequence of the majority’s
decision in Bonta is that attempts to invalidate SB 707 are
likely to be given short shrift by the California courts and the
Ninth Circuit of Appeals. This is particularly the case
because SB 707 arguably encourages parties to abide by
their arbitration agreements by providing that where the
drafter fails to do so, the other side can either escape
arbitration altogether or proceed to arbitration on more
favorable terms. Any successful attempt to challenge SB
707 would therefore likely have to go all the way to the
Supreme Court and this may not happen for some years.
However, provisions like SB 707 and AB 51 will certainly
reach the Supreme Court at some stage and whatever ruling
the apex court makes in any such case will tell us just how
far, or not, the Supreme Court has come regarding its
approach to interpreting the FAA.
IV.

I Don’t Like Arbitration Anymore
Companies have reacted in different ways to the
changing arbitration landscape, whether this is because of
new rulings or because of public pressure, with some opting
to reform arbitration rather than abandon it entirely. This is
the case with regards to DoorDash, which opted to change
its arbitration provider from the AAA to the International
Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR).141
Id. at 14 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
141
Alison Frankel, The Problem with Outsourcing Justice to Mass Arbitration
Services, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-usotc-mass-arbi-lawsuits-idINKCN20M00Z.
140
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DoorDash arguably entered into negotiations with CPR to
create new rules that would benefit DoorDash by not
requiring it to pay the high levels of case-initiation fees that
the AAA required.142 These changes would be significant
because “[a] company facing mass arbitration under the CPR
protocol might face hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees,
but the same employer could be on the hook for millions
under JAMS and AAA rules.” 143 In many respects, this may
be a good development for consumers or employees who
genuinely want their respective cases to go to arbitration and
are not simply using arbitration as a tactic to pressure the
other side into settlement. This is because businesses are
arguably more likely to agree to arbitration in such
circumstances rather than to drag their feet and resist
arbitration because of high costs. However, it is worth
noting that the process by which CPR developed the massarbitration protocol raises questions about the organization’s
independence and impartiality.144 Although the situation is
not the same as the National Arbitration Forum (NAF)
scandal of the 2000s,145 where said arbitral institution had a
financial interest in companies arbitrating before it, it is far
from ideal that only Doordash and not the plaintiffs had any
input into the development of the mass-arbitration
protocol.146 Moreover, it is a matter of public record that the
See id.
Id.
144
See Abernathy, supra note 106, at 1067.
145
See generally “Minnesota AG sues National Arbitration Forum”, online:
Minneapolis / St Paul Business Journal
<https://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2009/07/13/daily23.html>;
“National Arbitration Forum’s Wall of Secrecy Crumbling”, online: CL&P
Blog <https://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2006/10/national_arbitr.html>; The
Associated Press, “Firm Agrees to End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt”, The
New York Times (20 July 2009), online:
<https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/business/20credit.html>.
146
See generally F. Paul Bland, Jr., Arbitration or “Arbitrary”: The Misuse of
Arbitration to Collect Consumer Debts: Testimony to the Subcommittee on
Domestic Policy of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform, PUB. JUST. (July 22, 2009),
142
143
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protocol was developed in response to concerns raised by
Doordash’s counsel and repeatedly revised before final
publication.147 In this situation, plaintiffs unsatisfied with
the CPR mass-arbitration protocol but forced into it anyway
could challenge the arbitral procedure on grounds of bias or
unconscionability.148
On the other hand, some companies have opted to
simply abandon arbitration as regards certain types of
disputes. This is the case with Amazon and consumer
disputes: after receiving 75,000 requests from Amazon Echo
users, the company has opted to abandon consumer
arbitration altogether. 149 The old conditions of use read as
follows:
Any dispute or claim relating in any way
to your use of any Amazon Service, or to
any products or services sold or
distributed by Amazon or through
Amazon.com will be resolved by binding
arbitration, rather than in court, except
that you may assert claims in small claims
court if your claims qualify. The Federal
Arbitration Act and federal arbitration law
apply to this agreement.
There is no judge or jury in arbitration,
and court review of an arbitration
award is limited.
However, an
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/arbitration/testimonysept09-exhibit2.pdf.
147
See Abernathy, supra note 106, at 1067.
148
See Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration
Epidemic: Mandatory Arbitration Deprives Workers and Consumers of Their
Rights, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/thearbitration-epidemic/ (describing unconscionability as one possible challenge
to mandatory arbitration clauses, though largely circumscribed by various U.S.
Supreme Court decisions; similarly describing arbitrator bias as a means of
invalidating mandatory arbitration clauses under the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), though it has been interpreted “exceptionally narrowly”).
149
Clark, supra note 95; Amazon Faced, supra note 97.
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arbitrator can award on an individual
basis the same damages and relief as a
court
(including
injunctive
and
declaratory relief or statutory damages)
and must follow the terms of these
Conditions of Use as a court would.
To begin an arbitration proceeding, you
must send a letter requesting arbitration
and describing your claim to our registered
agent Corporation Service Company, 300
Deschutes Way SW, Suite 304, Tumwater,
WA 98501.
The arbitration will be
conducted by the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) under its rules,
including the AAA's Supplementary
Procedures
for
Consumer-Related
Disputes. The AAA's rules are available at
www.adr.org or by calling 1-800-778-7879.
Payment of all filing, administration and
arbitrator fees will be governed by the
AAA's rules. We will reimburse those fees
for claims totaling less than $10,000 unless
the arbitrator determines the claims are
frivolous. Likewise, Amazon will not seek
attorneys' fees and costs in arbitration
unless the arbitrator determines the claims
are frivolous. You may choose to have the
arbitration conducted by telephone, based
on written submissions, or in person in the
county where you live or at another
mutually agreed location.
We each agree that any dispute resolution
proceedings will be conducted only on an
individual basis and not in a class,
consolidated or representative action. If for

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2022

575

37

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 6
[Vol. 22: 539, 2022]

Employment Arbitration
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

any reason a claim proceeds in court rather
than in arbitration we each waive any right
to a jury trial. We also both agree that you
or we may bring suit in court to enjoin
infringement or other misuse of intellectual
property rights.150
The new conditions of use are significantly shorter
and reads: “Any dispute or claim relating in any way to your
use of any Amazon Service will be adjudicated in the state
or Federal courts in King County, Washington, and you
consent to exclusive jurisdiction and venue in these courts.
We each waive any right to a jury trial”. 151 Although
Amazon is just one company, the policy change is significant
because of Amazon’s dominant rule in the e-commerce
marketplace—for example, almost half of all e-commerce
sales happened on Amazon in 2018152 and that figure has
likely only grown with time. As a result, the number of
consumer arbitration agreements is likely to be significantly
lower than the over 800 million discussed by Szalai in his
2018 article. 153 That said, Amazon has not abandoned
employment arbitration and is clearly still attempting to
pursue cases in that field, as discussed above.
Another example of a business that has abandoned
the use of arbitration is Google. In 2019, as a result of the
#metoo movement (specifically a campaign by the
‘Googlers for Ending Forced Arbitration’ pressure group),154
among other things, Google decided to abandon the use of
Help: Conditions of Use, AMAZON.COM (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://web.archive.org/web/20190314000301/https://www.amazon.com/gp/he
lp/customer/display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeId=508088&ref_=footer_cou
(emphasis added).
151
Id.
152
Szalai, supra note 2, at 240.
153
Id.
154
End Forced Arbitration, GOOGLERS FOR ENDING FORCED ARBITRATION,
https://sites.google.com/view/endforcedarbitration (last visited Mar. 15, 2022).
150
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arbitration for its employees.155 However, this decision did
not affect contractors who make up a majority of individuals
working for Google and it is therefore important not to
overstate the importance of its decision. 156 It is also
important to note that Google has arguably always had a less
extreme preference for arbitration than other companies
given that it does not seem to have ever included arbitration
in its terms of service, instead opting for litigation in Santa
Clara or in earlier versions simply referring to a “court of
competent jurisdiction.”157 This, and the circumstances of
Google’s move away from arbitration due to the #metoo
movement, means that Amazon rather than Google probably
represents a better example of an about face regarding
arbitration.158
V.

Arbitration and the Right to Have Your Day in
Court: Meeting Again at the Turning of the Tide
It is clear from the above that there has been a
turning of the tide both in courts’ interpretations of
arbitration agreements and in companies’ usage of
arbitration.159 What is less clear is just how far the tide will
turn; are we going from a perigee to an apogee or merely
Alexia Fernández Campbell, Google Will Allow Employees to Sue the
Company. Here’s Why That Matters, VOX (Feb 22, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/technology/2019/2/22/18236172/mandatory-forcedarbitration-google-employees.
156
See End Forced Arbitration, Google promises end to mandatory arbitration
for all full-time employees by March 21, 2019, MEDIUM (Feb. 21 2019),
https://endforcedarbitration.medium.com/google-promised-end-to-mandatoryarbitration-for-all-full-time-employees-by-march-21-2019-1f5295ab1e9d.
157
Updates: Terms of Service, GOOGLE,
https://policies.google.com/terms/archive?hl=en-US, (last updated Jan. 5,
2022).
158
See Rakeen Mabud, Google Put an End to Force Arbitration and Why That’s
so Important, FORBES (Feb. 26, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rakeenmabud/2019/02/26/worker-organizingresults-in-big-change-at-google/?sh=2bc0e3b74399.
159
See Postmates Inc. v. 10,356 Individuals, 28554 LEXIS 1, 1–37 (U.S. Dist.
Jan. 2021); see also End Forced Arbitration, supra note 154.
155
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something in between? Or will the Supreme Court change
its mind again and reverse the reversal in arbitration’s
fortunes? As the saying goes “Only a fool would make
predictions—especially about the future;”160 that said, it is
possible to make some general observations with the caveat
that one is not trying to play the fool.
Firstly, despite the reversal’s arbitration has
suffered in the employment and consumer fields, it is highly
unlikely that companies will turn their backs on it altogether
or that the courts will abandon their pro-arbitration approach.
However, it is possible that companies’ enthusiasm for
arbitration will wane as the effects of decisions such as New
Prime and Abernathy wind their way through the arbitral
ecosystem. It is also likely that the courts will now adopt a
more nuanced approach to interpreting both the FAA and
arbitration clauses in situations that involve employees and
consumers.
Secondly, to the extent that companies do not
abandon arbitration in the employment and consumer sphere,
it is likely that more and more mass arbitration claims will
be filed by pioneering law firms such as Kelly Lenkner.161
The other side of that coin is that companies will inevitably
begin redrafting their arbitration agreements and seeking
tailored arbitration rules which can handle the strain of
responding to thousands or even tens of thousands of
individual arbitration claims at once. This has the potential
of nullifying the initial victory achieved by creating mass
arbitration, as the rules might impose conditions which deter
the filing of mass arbitration: For example, by requiring
consumers or employees to pay a higher proportion of the
fees.162 It is unlikely that state legislatures, or at least the
California legislature, would be willing to tolerate
Attributed to Samuel Goldwyn.
Amazon Faced, supra note 97.
162
See Dave Rochelson, Is This the End of Mandatory Arbitration?, 36
ANTITRUST 63, 63–64 (2021).
160
161
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conditions which significantly disincentivized employees or
consumers from filing arbitration claims and further
legislative reform to tackle such developments is therefore
likely. 163 The issue with this is the Supreme Court’s
preemption doctrine and it is therefore fairly likely that any
such regulations or developments will end up coming before
the apex court in the near future.164
Thirdly, it is likely that the Supreme Court will hear
several important cases concerning consumer and employee
arbitration in the post New Prime world due to the can of
worms opened by that case. 165 Currently, the Court is
deciding the case of Saxon v Southwest Airlines Co where it
must determine whether baggage handlers employed by
airlines fall within the ‘transportation workers’
exemption.166 Unless the issue is addressed in that case it is
likely that, in the near future, the Court will also have to
decide whether rideshare and gig economy delivery drivers
come within the scope of the FAA’s section 1 exemption.167
Another issue that will likely have to be addressed sooner or
later is whether the FAA preempts laws such as California’s
SB 707,168 indeed the Supreme Court is currently deciding,
in the case of Viking River Cruises Inc v Angie Moriana,169
whether a Californian law that allows individuals to raise
What are the California Rules Regarding Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements, and How do They Differ From Federal Law?, SHRM (Feb. 3,
2020),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hrqa/pages/californiamanadatoryarbitration.aspx.
164
Ryan A. Glasgow & Timothy Kim, U.S. Supreme Court Will Address Circuit
Split on Arbitration Waiver, 11 NATIONAL L. REV. 349, 349–50 (2021).
165
Imre S. Szalai, The Supreme Court’s Landmark Decision in New Prime Inc.
v. Oliveira: A Panoptic View of America’s Civil Justice System and Arbitration,
68 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1082 (2019).
166
See Saxon v. Southwest Airlines Co., supra note 57.
167
See Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F.3d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 2020).
168
Lauren Berg, Postmates Calls Calif. Arbitration Law Unconstitutional, LAW
360 (Oct. 6, 2021, 4:39 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1317341/postmates-calls-calif-arbitrationlaw-unconstitutional.
169
Viking Cruises Inc. v. Moriana, 142 S. Ct. 734, 211 L. Ed. 2d 421 (2021).
163
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representative employment claims as private attorney’sgeneral, notwithstanding a valid arbitration clause, is
preempted by the FAA.170 The Court’s decision in that case
may well lay out its approach to all such laws and provide
clues as to whether it is charting a less policy-oriented, and
more originalist, approach to FAA preemption.
In conclusion, the message of this article is: Watch
this space. Members of the US arbitration ecosystem,
whether they be willing members such as businesses or
unwilling members such as employees and consumers, have
very much been on a wild ride in the last few decades and
the recent decisions, new legislation, and changing behavior
by all involved means that this is only going to continue in
the future.

“Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana”, online: Oyez
<https://www.oyez.org/cases/2021/20-1573>.
170
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